Welcome to the Red Hat SELinux Guide. This guide addresses the complex world of SELinux policy, and has the goal of teaching you how to understand, use, administer, and troubleshoot SELinux in a Red Hat Enterprise Linux environment. SELinux, an implementation of mandatory access control (MAC) in the Linux kernel, adds the ability to administratively define policies on all subjects (processes) and objects (devices, files, and signaled processes). These terms are used as an abstract when discussing actors/doers and their targets on a system. This guide commonly refers to processes, the source of an operations, and objects, the target of an operation.
This guide opens with a short explanation of SELinux, some assumptions about the reader, and an explanation of document conventions. The first part of the guide provides an overview of the technical architecture and how policy works, specifically the policy that comes with Red Hat Enterprise Linux called the targeted policy. The second part focuses on working with SELinux, including maintaining and manipulating your systems, policy analysis, and compiling your custom policy. Working with some of the daemons that are confined by the targeted policy is discussed throughout. These daemons are collectively called the targeted daemons.
One powerful way of finding information in this guide is the Index. The Index has direct links to sections on specific terminology, and also features lists of various SELinux syntaxes, as well as what are/what is and how to entries.
This section is a very brief overview of SELinux. More detail is given in Part I Understanding SELinux and Appendix A Brief Background and History of SELinux.
Security-enhanced Linux (SELinux) is an implementation of a mandatory access control mechanism. This mechanism is in the Linux kernel, checking for allowed operations after standard Linux discretionary access controls are checked.
To understand the benefit of mandatory access control (MAC) over traditional discretionary access control (DAC), you need to first understand the limitations of DAC.
Under DAC, ownership of a file object provides potentially crippling or risky control over the object. A user can expose a file or directory to a security or confidentiality breach with a misconfigured chmod command and an unexpected propagation of access rights. A process started by that user, such as a CGI script, can do anything it wants to the files owned by the user. A compromised Apache HTTP server can perform any operation on files in the Web group. Malicious or broken software can have root-level access to the entire system, either by running as a root process or using setuid or setgid.
Under DAC, there are really only two major categories of users, administrators and non-administrators. In order for services and programs to run with any level of elevated privilege, the choices are few and course grained, and typically resolve to just giving full administrator access. Solutions such as ACLs (access control lists) can provide some additional security for allowing non-administrators expanded privileges, but for the most part a root account has complete discretion over the file system.
A MAC or non-discretionary access control framework allows you to define permissions for how all processes (called subjects) interact with other parts of the system such as files, devices, sockets, ports, and other processes (called objects in SELinux). This is done through an administratively-defined security policy over all processes and objects. These processes and objects are controlled through the kernel, and security decisions are made on all available information rather than just user identity. With this model, a process can be granted just the permissions it needs to be functional. This follows the principle of least privilege. Under MAC, for example, users who have exposed their data using chmod are protected by the fact that their data is a kind only associated with user home directories, and confined processes cannot touch those files without permission and purpose written into the policy.
SELinux is implemented in the Linux kernel using the LSM (Linux Security Modules) framework. This is only the latest implementation of an ongoing project, as detailed in Appendix A Brief Background and History of SELinux. To support fine-grained access control, SELinux implements two technologies: Type Enforcement™ (TE) and a kind of role-based access control (RBAC), which are discussed in Chapter 1 SELinux Architectural Overview.
Type Enforcement involves defining a type for every subject, that is, process, and object on the system. These types are defined by the SELinux policy and are contained in security labels on the files themselves, stored in the extended attributes (xattrs) of the file. When a type is associated with a processes, the type is called a domain, as in, "httpd is in the domain of httpd_t." This is a terminology difference leftover from other models when domains and types were handled separately.
All interactions between subjects and objects are disallowed by default on an SELinux system. The policy specifically allows certain operations. To know what to allow, TE uses a matrix of domains and object types derived from the policy. The matrix is derived from the policy rules. For example, allow httpd_t net_conf_t:file { read getattr lock ioctl }; gives the domain associated with httpd the permissions to read data out of specific network configuration files such as /etc/resolv.conf. The matrix clearly defines all the interactions of processes and the targets of their operations.
Because of this design, SELinux can implement very granular access controls. For Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 the policy has been designed to restrict only a specific list of daemons. All other processes run in an unconfined state. This policy is designed to help integrate SELinux into your development and production environment. It is possible to have a much more strict policy, which comes with an increase in maintenance complexity.